Dari tulisan yang ada pada kemasan amunisi tersebut dapat diduga apa isinya. Tanda segitiga menyatakan sumbernya adalah dari Libya. Tulisan 106mm menyatakan kaliber senjata tersebut. Istilah HEAT dalam dunia senjata berarti “High Explosive Anti Tank warhead” atau senjata berpeledak untuk menghancurkan tank lapis baja.
Tulisan Rifles M40 menyatakan jenis senjata yang menggunakan amunisi tersebut. nampaknya senjata yang dimaksud adalah M40 recoilless rifle
Beberapa hari lalu ada yang membuat video yang mencoba menjelaskan asal-usul ISIS, yan dimulai dari krisis di Libya. Videonya dapat dilihat di bawah ini, sedangkan teksnya dapat dibaca di http://scgnews.com/the-covert-origins-of-isis
Artikel berikut ini adalah terjemahan bebas dari video dan teks tersebut.
Pada tahun 2011 pemerintah Amerika secara terang-terangan berperan aktif di Libya, di antaranya:
Setelah pemerintahan Gaddafi ditumbangkan, gudang senjata di Libya dijarah, dan persenjataan dalam jumlah besar dikirim oleh pemberontak Libya ke Syria melalui Turki.
Terungkapnya pengiriman senjata ini terjadi hanya 3 hari sejak terbunuhnya dutabesar Amerika, Chris Stevens di kedutaan Amerika di Benghazi. Chris Stevens telah bertindak sebagai perwakilan pemerintah Amerika ke pemberontak Libya sejak bulan April 2011.
Jurnalis Seymour Hersh mengeluarkan sebuah artikel pada bulan April of 2014 yang menyatakan ada perjanjian rahasia antara CIA, Turki dan pemberontak Syria untuk membuat “rat line” atau “jalur tikus”. Jalur tikus ini adalah jaringan rahasia untuk mengirimkan senjata dan amunisi dari Libia ke Syria melalui Turki dan perbatasan Syria. Pendanaan disediakan oleh Turki, Arab Saudi dan Qatar.
AS dan sekutunya kini sepenuhnya fokus pada menumbangkan pemerintah Assad di Suriah. Seperti di Libya perubahan rezim ini dibingkai dalam kerangka hak asasi manusia, dan dukungan terbuka mulai melengkapi dukungan di belakang layar. Kehadiran pasukan jihad ditutup-tutupi.
Namun sejak pasukan pemberontak mendapatkan kekuatan, laporan kejahatan perang dan kekejaman yang mereka lakukan mulai membuat masalah humas/public relations bagi Amerika. Akhirnya menjadi kebijakan standar di mana AS menyatakan dukungan AS hanya diberikan kepada yang disebut sebagai pasukan pemberontak “moderat”.
Perbedaan ini, bagaimanapun, kenyataannya tidak berdasar.
Dalam sebuah wawancara yang diberikan pada April 2014, komandan FSA (Free Syrian Army) Jamal Maarouf mengakui bahwa para pejuang FSA secara teratur melakukan operasi gabungan dengan Al-Nusra. Al-Nusra adalah cabang Al-Qaeda resmi di Suriah. Pernyataan ini selanjutnya divalidasi oleh sebuah wawancara yang diberikan pada bulan Juni 2013 oleh Kolonel Abdel Basset Al-Tawil, komandan FSA Front Utara. Dalam wawancara ini ia secara terbuka membahas hubungan dengan Al-Nusra, dan mengungkapkan keinginannya untuk melihat Suriah diperintah oleh hukum syariah. (Identitas kedua komandan dapat diverifikasi dari dokumen resmi dari The Institute of the Study of War)
Dan hubungan FSA antara Al-Nusra hanyalah awalnya. Pada bulan Juni 2014 Al-Nusra bergabung dengan ISIS di perbatasan antara Irak dan Suriah.
Jadi menegaskan: FSA bekerja sama dengan Al-Nusra, Al-Nusra bekerja sama dengan ISIS, dan Amerika Serikat telah mengirim uang dan senjata kepada FSA meskipun mereka telah tahu sejak 2012 bahwa sebagian besar senjata-senjata tersebut akhirnya sampai di tangan ekstremis.
[UPDATE 9.03.14]: Pensiunan Letnan Jenderal Tom McInerney mengakui: “Kami Membantu Membangun ISIS”:
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[UPDATE 9.03.14]: Retired Lt. Gen. Tom McInerney admits: “We Helped Build ISIS”:
Syria, we backed I believe, in some cases some of the wrong people and not in the right part of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) that’s a little confusing to people. So I’ve always maintained, and go back quite some time that we were backing the wrong types. I think it’s going to turn out maybe this weekend in a new special that Brett Baer is going to have Friday that’s gonna show some of those weapons from Benghazi ended up in the hands of ISIS. So we helped build ISIS.
After the second sarin gas fiasco, which was also exposed and therefore failed to garner public support for airstrikes, the U.S. continued to increase its the training and support for the rebels.
In February of 2014, Haaretz reported that the U.S. and its allies in the region, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel, were in the process of helping the Syrian rebels plan and prepare for a massive attack in the south. According to Haaretz Israel had also provided direct assistance in military operations against Assad four months prior (you can access a free cached version of the page here).
Then in May of 2014 PBS ran a report in which they interviewed rebels who were trained by the U.S. in Qatar. According to those rebels they were being trained to finish off soldiers who survived attacks.
“They trained us to ambush regime or enemy vehicles and cut off the road,” said the fighter, who is identified only as “Hussein.” “They also trained us on how to attack a vehicle, raid it, retrieve information or weapons and munitions, and how to finish off soldiers still alive after an ambush.”
This is a blatant violation of the Geneva conventions. It also runs contrary to conventional military strategy. In conventional military strategy soldiers are better off left wounded, because this ends up costing the enemy more resources. Executing captured enemy soldiers is the kind of tactic used when you want to strike terror in the hearts of the enemy. It also just happens to be standard operating procedure for ISIS.
One month after this report, in June of 2014, ISIS made its dramatic entry, crossing over the Syrian border into Iraq, capturing Mosul, Baiji and almost reaching Baghdad. The internet was suddenly flooded with footage of drive by shootings, large scale death marches, and mass graves. And of course any Iraqi soldier that was captured was executed.
Massive quantities of American military equipment were seized during that operation. ISIS took entire truckloads of humvees, they took helicopters, tanks, and artillery. They photographed and video taped themselves and advertised what they were doing on social media, and yet for some reason Washington didn’t even TRY to stop them.
U.S. military doctrine clearly calls for the destruction of military equipment and supplies when friendly forces cannot prevent them from falling into enemy hands, but that didn’t happen here. ISIS was allowed to carry this equipment out of Iraq and into Syria unimpeded. The U.S. military had the means to strike these convoys, but they didn’t lift a finger, even though they had been launching drone strikes in Pakistan that same week.
Why would they do that?
Though Obama plays the role of a weak, indecisive, liberal president, and while pundits from the right have had a lot of fun with that image, this is just a facade. Some presidents, like George W. Bush, rely primarily on overt military aggression. Obama gets the same job done, but he prefers covert means. Not really surprising considering the fact that Zbigniew Brzezinski was his mentor.
Those who know their history will remember that Zbigniew Brzezinski was directly involved in the funding and arming the Islamic extremists in Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to weaken the Soviets.
By the way Osama bin Laden was one of these anti-Soviet “freedom fighters” the U.S. was funding and arming.
This operation is no secret at this point, nor are the unintended side effects.
The strategy worked. The Soviets invaded, and the ten years of war that followed are considered by many historians as being one of the primary causes of the fall of the USSR.
This example doesn’t just establish precedent, what we’re seeing happen in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria right now is actually a continuation of a old story. Al-Nusra and ISIS are ideological and organizational decedents of these extremist elements that the U.S. government made use of thirty years ago.
The U.S. the went on to create a breeding ground for these extremists by invading Iraq in 2003. Had it not been for the vacuum of power left by the removal and execution of Saddam, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, aka ISIS, would not exist. And had it not been for Washington’s attempt at toppling Assad by arming, funding and training shadowy militant groups in Syria, there is no way that ISIS would have been capable of storming into Iraq in June of 2014.
On every level, no matter how you cut it, ISIS is a product of U.S. government’s twisted and decrepit foreign policy.
Now all of this may seem contradictory to you as you watch the drums of war against ISIS begin to beat louder and the air strikes against them are gradually widened http://www.wjla.com/articles/2014/08/president-obama-considers-possible-…). Why would the U.S. help a terrorist organization get established, only to attack them later?
Well why did the CIA put Saddam Hussein in power in 1963?, Why did the U.S. government back Saddam in 1980 when he launched a war of aggression against Iran, even though they knew that he was using chemical weapons? Why did the U.S. fund and arm Islamic extremists in Afghanistan against the Soviets?
There’s a pattern here if you look closely. This is a tried and true geopolitical strategy.
Step 1: Build up a dictator or extremist group which can then be used to wage proxy wars against opponents. During this stage any crimes committed by these proxies are swept under the rug. [Problem]
Step 2: When these nasty characters have outlived their usefulness, that’s when it’s time to pull out all that dirt from under the rug and start publicizing it 24/7. This obviously works best when the public has no idea how these bad guys came to power.[Reaction]
Step 3: Finally, when the public practically begging for the government to do something, a solution is proposed. Usually the solution involves military intervention, the loss of certain liberties, or both. [Solution]
ISIS is extremely useful. They have essentially done Washington dirty work by weakening Assad. In 2014, while the news cycle has focused almost exclusively on Ukraine and Russia, ISIS made major headway in Syria, and as of August they already controlled 35% of the country.
Since ISIS largely based in Syria, this gives the U.S. a pretext to move into Syria. Sooner or later the U.S. will extend the airstrikes into Assad’s backyard, and when they do U.S. officials are already making it clear that both ISIS and the Syrian government will be targeted. That, after all, is the whole point. Washington may allow ISIS to capture a bit more territory first, but the writing is on the wall, and has been for some time now.
The Obama administration has repeatedly insisted that this will never lead to boots on the ground, however, the truth of the matter is that anyone who understands anything about military tactics knows full well that ISIS cannot be defeated by airstrikes alone. In response to airstrikes ISIS will merely disperse and conceal their forces. ISIS isn’t an established state power which can be destroyed by knocking out key government buildings and infrastructure. These are guerrilla fighters who cut their teeth in urban warfare.
To significantly weaken them, the war will have to involve ground troops, but even this is a lost cause. U.S. troops could certainly route ISIS in street to street battles for some time, and they might even succeed in fully occupying Syria and Iraq for a number of years, but eventually they will have to leave, and when they do, it should be obvious what will come next.
The puppets that the U.S. government has installed in the various countries that they have brought down in recent years have without exception proven to be utterly incompetent and corrupt. No one that Washington places in power will be capable of maintaining stability in Syria. Period.
Right now, Assad is the last bastion of stability in the region. He is the last chance they have for a moderate non-sectarian government and he is the only hope of anything even remotely resembling democracy for the foreseeable future. If Assad falls, Islamic extremist will take the helm, they will impose shari’ah law, and they will do everything in their power to continue spreading their ideology as far and wide as they can.
If the world truly wants to stop ISIS, there is only one way to do it:
1. First and foremost, the U.S. government and its allies must be heavily pressured to cut all support to the rebels who are attempting to topple Assad. Even if these rebels that the U.S. is arming and funding were moderate, and they’re not, the fact that they are forcing Assad to fight a war on multiple fronts, only strengthens ISIS. This is lunacy.
2. The Syrian government should be provided with financial support, equipment, training and intelligence to enable them to turn the tide against ISIS. This is their territory, they should be the ones to reclaim it.
Now obviously this support isn’t going to come from the U.S. or any NATO country, but there are a number of nations who have a strategic interest in preventing another regime change and chaotic aftermath. If these countries respond promptly, as in right now, they could preempt a U.S. intervention, and as long this support does not include the presence of foreign troops, doing so will greatly reduce the likelihood of a major confrontation down the road.
3. The U.S. government and its allies should should be aggressively condemned for their failed regime change policies and the individuals behind these decisions should be charged for war crimes. This would have to be done on an nation by nation level since the U.N. has done nothing but enable NATO aggression. While this may not immediately result in these criminals being arrested, it would send a message. This can be done. Malaysia has already proven this by convicting the Bush administration of war crimes in abstentia.
Now you might be thinking: “This all sounds fine and good, but what does this have to do with me? I can’t influence this situation.”
That perspective is quite common, and for most people, it’s paralyzing, but the truth of the matter is that we can influence this. We’ve done it before, and we can do it again.
I’ll be honest with you though, this isn’t going to be easy. To succeed we have to start thinking strategically. Like it or not, this is a chess game. If we really want to rock the boat, we have to start reaching out to people in positions of influence. This can mean talking to broadcasters at your local radio station, news paper, or t.v. station, or it can mean contacting influential bloggers, celebrities, business figures or government officials. Reaching out to current serving military and young people who may be considering joining up is also important. But even if it’s just your neighbor, or your coworker, every single person we can reach brings us closer to critical mass. The most important step is to start trying.
If you are confused about why this is all happening, watch this video we put out on September 11th, 2012
Pada artikel ini saya membandingkan foto display berbagai gadget yang diperbesar sampai pikselnya nampak jelas. Semua foto dibuat dengan kamera Canon 50D dengan lensa makro Sigma AF 150mm f/2.8 APO EX HSM, kemudian foto tersebut masing-masing dicrop dengan ukuran 400×400 pixel.
LCD Resolusi Tinggi
Pertama-tama adalah display dengan resolusi tinggi, yang trendnya dimulai dengan Retina Display dari Apple, namun sekarang sudah banyak notebook dan tablet / smartphone yang menggunakannya.
Berikut ini adalah foto dari monitor LCD Mac Book Pro Retina 15″ dengan resolusi 2880×1800.
Berikut ini adalah foto dari monitor laptop Lenovo X1 Carbon Touch dengan resolusi 2560×1440 pixel.
Berikut ini adalah iPad Air.
Berikut ini adalah smartphone Samsung Galaxy S4 dengan teknologi AMOLED dan peletakan RGB dengan pola matriks Pen Tile.
Masih menunggu proses: Apple Mac Book Pro, Apple iMac, Nexus 5.
LCD Resolusi Sedang
Resolusi ‘biasa’, saat ini bersaing ketat dengan tampilan resolusi tinggi.
Keuntungan utama notebook ini adalah kecil dan ringan.
Notebook ini mempunyai fitur port USB “Sleep And Charge” yang dapat dipergunakan sebagai charger walaupun notebook sedang tidak aktif, seperti diulas di artikel Notebook Sebagai Powerbank.
Ukuran pixel standar, relatif besar dibandingkan Retina display di Mac Book.
Berikut ini perbandingan foto makro antara display Samsung Galaxy S4 dengan display Blackberry Gemini 8520 dan Blackberry 9220. Nampak sekali bahwa titik/piksel di display Samsung Galaxy S4 lebih kecil dibandingkan yang lainnya.
Handphone ini dibeli sekitar tahun 2009. Paket pembeliannya sudah termasuk protektor karet warna hitam. Pada waktu itu (2009) kemampuannya sudah cukup lumayan. Pada tahun 2014 ini saya rasakan kelemahannya:
Relatif lambat dibandingkan handphone baru
Proses menghapus SMS terasa lambat, padahal memory SMS cuma dapat menampung sekitar 400.
Kelebihan yang masih terasa:
Hemat batere, dapat tahan beberapa hari standby, dibandingkan dengan smartphone canggih seperti Samsung Galaxy S4 yang tiap hari baterenya minta dicharge.
Untuk penggunaan menelepon dan SMS, handphone ini masih cukup enak.
Update 14 November 2015: Card reader Mumuksu MCR-381 akhirnya rusak, seperti dibahas di artikel Card Reader Mumuksu MCR-390.
Banyak notebook saat ini sudah dilengkapi dengan SD card reader, sehingga kita tidak perlu lagi membeli SD card reader. Namun jika kita menggunakan Compact Flash memory card maka kita perlu menggunakan card reader khusus. Dari pengalaman menggunakan berbagai card reader, ternyata banyak yang abal-abal, hanya berfungsi sebentar terus mati, atau tidak kompatibel dengan card tertentu. Dari sekian banyak card reader yang saya coba, salah satu yang bertahan adalah Mumuksu MCR 381. Cukup cepat, kompatibel dengan USB 3.0 dan tidak rewel.
Dari hasil percobaan sejaun ini, barang ini terbukti kompatibel dengan Windows 7 dan Mac Book Pro. Penyakit barang ini adalah kadang mesti digoyang-goyang baru bisa nyambung dengan komputernya, kemungkinan ada kabel longgar di dalamnya atau konektor USBnya tidak pas.
Detail spesifikasinya agak sulit dicari. Website resmi Mumuksu isinya tidak jelas ( http://mumuksutech.blogspot.com/ , kemudian pindah ke http://www.mumuksu.com) , nampaknya perusahaan ini hidupnya pas-pasan untuk bikin card reader, sehingga tidak sempat membuat website yang serius.
Berikut spesifikasi yang saya temukan:
Manufacturer Code316165005386
Shipping Weight0.090 Kg
Dimensions4 * 19 * 3
Description
Memory card reader is very practical because it has an integrated USB connector and can be inserted into the card reader was so easy to carry and require no additional wiring. Supports memory cards on the market such as SD / MMC, Mini and Micro SD, Memory Stick, M2 and XD Card. For Micro SD (T-Flash) and the Stick Micro (M2) without the addition of direct-slot adapter. This card reader supports SD SDXC latest technology. Uniquely from the card reader have a dual slot for SD / SDHC / SDXC and dual slot micro SD / SDHC and can read the 3 (three) as well as the installed memory card simultaneously.
Feature
2xSD and 2xMicroSD available
SDHC/MicroSDHC to SDHC/MicroSDHC
Compliant with the USB2.0/1.1 specification
Support CompactFlash Ultra DMA mode 7
Hidden USB 3.0 Cable
Support major memory cards including the SDXC and latest MSXC
Plug and play simplicity
Auto detect card memory
Support USB 3.0 Ultra Hi-Speed transfer 100MB/s
Support 5Gps super-SpeedU/480Mbps high-speed and 12Mbps full-speed transfer rates
Support bus-powered modes
Package
MUMUKSU USB3.0 MULTI-SD2GO CARDREADER (MCR-381)
Requirement
Windows 2000 SP4/XP SP3/2003/Vista/7, Mac OS X, Linux Fedora/RedHat or above
Sebuah kalkulator serbaguna yang cukup bagus untuk dipakai kuliah dan perhitungan ringan. Kalau perlu pekerjaan berat, kita bisa pakai Matlab atau Mathematica atau Wolfram Alpha
Fitur utama:
(Natural Input / Natural output)
Integration / Differential , Equation calculation , Matrix calculations / Vector calculations , Complex number calculation , CALC function / SOLVE function , Base-n calculation
Fitur perhitungan standar:
• Fraction calculation
• Combination and Permutation
• Logarithm log
• List-based STAT data editor
• Standard deviation
• Paired-variable statistics regression analysis
• Logical operations
• Table function
• 40 scientific constants
• 40 metric conversions (20 conversion pairs)
• 9 variable memories
• Comes with new slide on hard case
Berikut ini adalah tampilan LCD kalkulator tersebut dilihat dari jarak dekat
ISIS, Al-Qaeda and the Arab revolutions: Al Qaeda memilih menumbangkan pemerintahan dengan bekerjasama dengan kelompok-kelompok lain, baru kemudian mendirikan negara Islam. ISIS langsung mendirikan negara, meskipun dengan menuduh kelompok-kelompok lain sebagai sesat.
Accusing opponents and the general community of apostasy: ISIS aktif menuduh lawan-lawannya dan masyarakat umum sebagai sesat.
Fighting the enemy that is near first: Al Qaeda beroperasi di seluruh dunia, ISIS hanya aktif di daerah Irak , Syria dan sekitarnya saja.
The strategy of sectarian mobilization against antagonists: ISIS aktif menyerang kelompok-kelompok syi’ah.
Severing links to Iran by divorcing itself from Al-Qaeda: Al Qaeda masih ada hubungan dengan Iran. ISIS tidak ada hubungan resmi dengan Iran. Malah sempat terjadi kontak senjata antara ISIS dengan Iran di Qasre Shirin.
A different and brutal media strategy: Pemimpin Al Qaeda sering muncul di media massa. Pemimpin ISIS jarang muncul. ISIS lebih menekankan berita-berita mengenai aksi di lapangan.
An immoral, tougher and more extreme Salafist Jihadism: pandangan ISIS lebih ekstrim dibandingkan Al Qaeda.
Hani Nesira, Al Arabiya Institute for Studies
Thursday, 19 June 2014
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is moving according to strategies and perspectives of a state lying amid violent hotbeds and safe havens. It creeps into structures of unsuccessful regimes while flourishing during their periods of turmoil.
This is why ISIS believes it is capable of leading global jihad, unlike Al-Qaeda which focuses on the distant enemy rather than the enemy that is near. Al-Qaeda’s central leadership has weakened and is incapable of supporting its affiliates.
This is what qualifies ISIS, with its constant expansion and successes in chaotic contexts on the national, regional and international levels, to take over Al-Qaeda and the leadership of global jihad.
We can identify features that distinguish Al-Qaeda from ISIS such as the former’s apparent lack of moral principles, unlike Al-Qaeda, as well as its operational focus on expanding on the geographical level to establish an interconnected state described as the “ISIS crescent.”
This sought-after state extends from historical Diyarbakir (southeast Turkey) and includes Raqqah (north central Syria), Mosul and Nineveh (both in Iraq) among others.
Leading figures in ISIS also rarely make media appearance, unlike their counterparts in Al-Qaeda.
The two entities can be distinguished in terms of the following seven points:
1- ISIS, Al-Qaeda and the Arab revolutions
ISIS did not wait to get involved in the Syrian revolution and almost immediately began accusing parties on the ground of being apostates, mainly the Free Syrian Army, in a practice known as takfir.
The group believes that the FSA is more evil than the Syrian regime and the Sahawat and launched an offensive against the Syrian opposition group, killing many of its activists. Nor did ISIS confront the Damascus regime, choosing instead to focus on fighting revolutionary factions in regions it controlled.
This stands in contrast to the stances taken by Al-Qaeda’s leadership which welcomed the revolutions aimed at toppling longstanding regimes in the region.
This general view was expressed by the founder of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, before his death on May 2, 2011. The same stance was expressed by Aiman Al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s successor, who in 2011 issued an address to Egyptians titled a “Message of hope and glad tidings for our people in Egypt.” The late Anwar Al-Awlaki issued a similar stance in his message about the Yemeni revolution. The Libyan revolution was viewed in a similar manner by the late Atiyatallah Al-Libi. This view was repeated in Abdullah Al-Adam’s booklet titled “Revolution of the Peoples: Is It the End of the Protested Kings?” in which al-Adam expressed his desire to wait until the triumph of the revolution before intervening to support the establishment of an Islamic state.
ISIS is well known for accusing different armies, opponents and general communities – not just rulers – of apostasy, particularly those who do not seek recourse to Sharia as a rule and reference.
In his message to Al-Zawahiri on May 12, ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammad al-Adnani blamed Bin Laden’s successor and Al-Qaeda, saying:
“We invite you secondly to correct your doctrines; declare openly the apostasy of the Egyptian, Pakistani, Afghani, Tunisian, Libyan and Yemeni armies and all the other armies of tyrants and their supporters; not manipulate legitimate commands and expressions as you have done in your descriptions of “corrupt rule,” “void constitution” and “pro-American army”; issue a frank call to fight the Egyptian army of [Abdel Fattah] Al-Sisi – the new Pharaoh of Egypt; disassociate from [Mohammad] Mursi and his party as well as openly declare his apostasy and stop causing misconceptions among Muslims.”
Al-Adnani also refuted Al-Zawahiri’s description of Egypt’s ousted president Mursi as being a victim.
ISIS also criticized jihadists belonging to the Nusra Front and their leader, Muhammad Al-Jawlani, who affirmed his allegiance to Al-Zawahiri.
ISIS labeled Al-Jawlani a traitor and insisted on its war against him and maintaining the group’s stance regarding the Sahawat and other factions involved in the Syrian revolution, namely the FSA.
3- Fighting the enemy that is near first
Unlike Al-Qaeda and Al-Zarqawy (1966-2006), ISIS prefers to fight the enemy that near to it, focusing on regions where it is present, and prioritizes the expansion of its influence over offering guidance and forging a spiritual connection among jihadists around the world.
The latter was a goal of Al-Qaeda and its central leadership which have become isolated from their supporters on the Pakistani and Afghan borders ever since Sept. 11, 2011.
Al-Qaeda is in distress after the loss of its most prominent and influential leaders in recent years such as its founder, Bin Laden, and Al-Libi in 2011, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid in 2008 and many others.
The suicide operations by ISIS are conducted exclusively in Iraq and Syria. The group has not conducted sting operations against the West or the United States, in line with ISIS’ conception of itself as a state and not an organization like the Taliban.
4- The strategy of sectarian mobilization against antagonists
Unlike Al-Qaeda, Al-Zarqawi and ISIS have attacked Shiite rallies. Their organizations have published studies that support labeling all Shiites as apostates.
Al-Zarqawi has released several videos in which he stresses the righteousness of his practices.
He also condemns his critics, mainly Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi.
As noted by Fatih Karikar, Al-Zarqawi’s strategy was to work on the sectarian mobilization of Sunnis against the Shiite rise after the fall of Saddam Hussein. He saw it as an opportunity to form a Sunni army in order to achieve the goal of establishing or restoring the Caliphate and the Islamic state.
This is what ISIS is apparently doing in Iraq, supported by the speeches and practices of Nouri Al-Maliki and Bashar al-Assad.
5- Severing links to Iran by divorcing itself from Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda never attacked Iran, nor did it support any Sunni organization targeting the Iranian regime. ISIS was similarly committed and complicit in this arrangement until it broke off from Al-Qaeda and ultimately Iran. Al-Adnani expressed this in his message when he said that the organization abided by these guidelines “in compliance with Al-Qaeda’s order to preserve its interests and supply lines in Iran.”
Apparently, this contradiction reveals the pragmatism of both organizations and their undeclared connection with Iran, which served as a safe haven to many of their leaders after 2011, as per Saif Al-Adel’s analysis of Al-Zarqawi’s statement, which revealed the true identity of Yassin al-Suri, known as “Al-Qaeda’s fox.” In December 2011, the U.S. administration said Al-Suri had been moving freely in Iran between 2005 and 2011.
6- A different and brutal media strategy
ISIS may have benefited from Al-Zarqawi death, which was likely linked to his repeated appearances. This explains why ISIS leaders chose not to make appearances, as opposed to Al-Qaeda’s leaders.
ISIS media focuses on its operations on the ground and facts, avoiding theoretical and intellectual debates with the group’s opponents.
In contrast, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the present leader of Al-Qaeda, has made frequent appearances, whether in the open meetings where he has answered questions or fatwas from his opponents or the series of “peoples’ messages” dedicated to the Egyptians among others.
ISIS media messages are limited. The group focuses on the military and operational side as part of a fear campaign aimed at its opponents. Their media tactics are similar to those of Al-Zarqawi in terms of the level of violence in the messages. In 2004, Al-Zarqawi posted a video in which he is seen beheading U.S. civilian Nicholas Berg. The video was shocking and terrifying and was highly criticized back then, even from Al-Qaeda’s leaders and strategists. This is what ISIS is doing now.
7- An immoral, tougher and more extreme Salafist Jihadism:
ISIS has no ethics and it seems to rely on the ideological beliefs of extreme Salafist Jihadism, unlike many of Al-Qaeda’s on-ground commanders such as Abdullah Azzam, Al-Zawahiri, Al-Libi, Al-Ayiri, Al-Tuwayli and others whose views were known from their writings. Other Al-Qaeda theorists included Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, Abi-Qatada Al-Filistini and Abdul Qader bin Abdul Aziz.
But it seems that ISIS has adopted the firmness of Salafists without referring to Al-Zawahiri’s ideology, nor debated views of fellow jihadists who criticize it and are against it. ISIS is an organization with the perception of a state. Its battles are tangible and not theoretical: it carries out direct confrontations, unlike Al-Zawahiri, who entered indirect confrontations with his critics.
ISIS shares Al-Zarqawi’s vision. He was not the most educated or cultivated among leaders of the jihadists’ Shura Council which he established in 2005, but he was always present on the field and enjoyed the strongest of organizational skills.